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ABSTRACT: Many Medicare beneficiaries signed up for the new Part D benefit
during the program’s first two years. Subsequently, a significant majority of them
reported that the benefit was too complicated, and some observers suggest that the
complexity may have thwarted some beneficiaries from finding the plan that was
best for them. Meanwhile, more than 4 million of those eligible failed to enroll at
all. Although some degree of standardization may occur naturally as the market
evolves, steps can be taken to simplify the program and make it easier for benefici-
aries to make good choices among plans—and for them to enroll in the first place.
This issue brief considers specific options for simplifying Part D in several areas:
standardizing the benefit descriptions and procedures used by plans and the
Medicare program; further standardization of the plan’s benefit parameters, particu-
larly the rules for cost-sharing; and changes to the rules governing plan formularies.
*    *    *    *    *
Overview
The Medicare prescription drug benefit (Part D) has finished its first two
years with mixed results. Although many Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in
Part D drug plans, authorized by the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), a significant major-
ity of them reported that the selection process was much too complicated.1
Some observers have suggested that the complexity of the benefit designs,
and their variations among the numerous plans offered, thwarted some
people from finding the plan that was best for them—or from enrolling in
Part D in the first place. Indeed, some of the estimated 4.6 million benefi-
ciaries who still have no source of drug coverage might have enrolled had
the process of choosing been less confusing. 
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For those who did enroll, many discovered
before long that their plan did not meet their
needs particularly well and that another plan
offered in their market area might have been bet-
ter. This problem could be exacerbated over time
as sponsors change their plan offerings from year
to year.2 Even though enrollees have the option of
switching plans each year, the difficulty associated
with researching their options and the potential
disruption in making a change reinforce an under-
lying preference for sticking with the decision
already made.3 A low rate of switching can be
viewed as a sign of satisfaction. But the success of
a market-based system relies on enrollees being
able to reexamine their enrollment decisions in
response to changes in plan offerings, plan per-
formance, and their own circumstances, and the
lack of clear and understandable information can
interfere with their ability to make appropriate
enrollment decisions.
To reduce the current complexity, a broad
array of health care opinion leaders have suggested
that Part D plans should become more standard-
ized—that steps should be taken to simplify the
program and make it easier for beneficiaries to
make good choices about enrollment and among
plans. Incremental changes might include require-
ments that plans use the same terms to describe
the same benefits, while more substantial reforms
might, for example, restrict some variations in the
benefits that plans could offer.
Some observers contend, however, that as
the market matures the program will become eas-
ier to navigate and standardization will prove
unnecessary. Others want to wait and see if some
degree of standardization occurs naturally as the
organizations offering plans respond to market
pressures. Meanwhile, many believe that continued
outreach alone would convince more non-
enrollees to join Part D plans.4
After assessing the main arguments for and
against introducing more standardization into the
Medicare drug benefit, this issue brief considers
specific standardization options in three areas:
1. Benefit descriptions used by plans and
Medicare, and plans’ procedures (such as
prior authorization) for managing utiliza-
tion
2. Plans’ rules for cost-sharing (including
deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments)
3. Rules for how formularies can be designed
The suggestions proposed in this brief for
increasing standardization in Medicare Part D are
intended to reduce beneficiaries’ confusion and
anxiety in making decisions about participation.
Better information and more clearly defined
choices might increase their ability to make appro-
priate decisions about Part D, improve their well-
being, and strengthen the program.
An Array of Prescription Drug Plan Choices
To receive prescription drug coverage, a Medicare
beneficiary must enroll in a private prescription
drug plan (PDP); in 2008, more than 1,800 
PDPs in 39 regions competed for such enroll-
ments.5 Alternatively, the beneficiary may have
employer-sponsored retiree coverage that qualifies
for a subsidy. 
In addition, Medicare Advantage (MA)
organizations offer private plans that Medicare
beneficiaries have the option to join instead of tra-
ditional Medicare. Such organizations are required
to offer at least one plan with a qualified drug
benefit (MA-PD) in each area they serve. So, if
MA enrollees want a drug benefit, they must get it
from their MA plan. Although availability varies
geographically, more than 2,000 MA-PDs were
offered in 2008 to beneficiaries across the nation.
This issue brief concentrates, however, on PDPs,
which provide more than two-thirds of Medicare
Part D coverage.
The MMA established a standard benefit
design by which the beneficiary experiences pre-
scribed degrees of cost-sharing, at least in principle. He
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a specialty tier for high-cost biotechnology prod-
ucts or injectable drugs. Relatively few plans have
chosen to fill the coverage gap (sometimes referred
to as the “doughnut hole”) at all, and most that do
only cover generic drugs in the gap.6 The result is
that beneficiaries face a wide variety of designs, as indi-
cated by the sample in Table 1.
To appreciate the degree of variation, con-
sider that a beneficiary with a prescription for a
generic drug faces no copayment in one plan, a $7
copayment in another, and 25 percent of the
drug’s cost in a third. A beneficiary with a choice
between a preferred brand-name drug and a
generic alternative would pay $45 more for the
brand with coverage from Wellcare Signature but
just $15 more with the AARP Saver plan. The cost
of a brand-name drug is only $20 (as a preferred
product) in one plan, $107 (as a nonpreferred
product) in another plan, and 75 percent of the
drug’s cost in yet another. 
Formularies also vary considerably among
Part D plans. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) reviews each plan for-
or she is responsible for an annual deductible ($275
in 2008), 25 percent of drug costs up to an initial
coverage limit ($2,510 in total costs for covered
drugs in 2008), the full cost of drugs in the cover-
age gap after this initial coverage limit is exceeded,
and only modest cost-sharing thereafter once a
particular level of accumulated out-of-pocket costs
($4,050 in 2008) has been reached. Cost-sharing at
this latter stage is the greatest of $2.25 for a
generic, $5.60 for a brand-name drug, or 5 percent
of the cost of the drug.
Most PDPs, however, have benefits that
either are actuarially equivalent variations on the
standard benefit or are enhanced with more gener-
ous coverage. The majority of plans have elimi-
nated the standard deductible, substituted flat
copayments for coinsurance, and adopted tiered
cost-sharing (whereby the beneficiary pays differ-
ent amounts for different types of drugs). Most
commonly, plans employ three tiers—with escalat-
ing copayments for generic drugs, preferred brand-
name drugs, and nonpreferred brand-name drugs,
in that order. By 2008, most plans also have added
Plan Deductible Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Specialty
tier
Gap
coverage
Aetna Essentials $275 $3 $39 $80 25% None
Aetna Premier $0 $4 $40 $70 33% Generics
Humana Standard $275 No tiers – 25% coinsurance None
Humana Complete $0 $4 $25 $54 25% PreferredGenerics
Medco Medicare Choice $0 $6 $35 75% 33% None
Sterling Rx Plus $100 $0 $25 25% 25% None 
United Healthcare/ AARP Preferred $0 $7 $30 $74.85 33% None
United Healthcare/ AARP Saver $275 $5 $20 $49.68 25% None
Wellcare Signature $0 $0 $45 $107 33% None
Note: Some values are median amounts for plans that use different tiered cost-sharing arrangements across regions.
Source: J. Hoadley, E. Hargrave, and K. Merrell, Methodology Appendix to the Medicare Part D 2008 Data Spotlights (Washington, D.C.: Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, Jan. 2008).
Table 1. Illustrative Plan Designs Offered on National Basis, 2008
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mulary under a number of specific guidelines
designed to prevent it from discriminating against
certain beneficiaries.7 Within these rules, plans
have made significantly different decisions about
the extensiveness of their formularies. Plan formu-
laries include between 47 percent and 100 percent
of eligible drugs. Plans also differ in how they
assign their formulary drugs to tiers and in how
often they employ cost-management tools such as
prior authorization or step therapy.8
Plans have the option of offering enhanced
packages with an actuarial value greater than the
standard package. Plans use this option to reduce
cost-sharing, waive deductibles, add gap coverage,
or offer more extensive formularies. In 2007, CMS
started labeling the packages that offered enhanced
benefits, but the linkage between the enhanced value of
the package and the premium is not readily apparent to
the consumer. 
Arguments in Favor of Standardization
Many beneficiaries and the counselors who help
them navigate the array of program choices would
like to see the program simplified through some
degree of standardization. Although a majority of
beneficiaries have found Medicare Part D helpful,
73 percent say the benefit is too complicated.9
Remedying this complexity was the first recom-
mendation of a panel of State Health Insurance
Assistance Program directors convened by the
Kaiser Family Foundation. Panelists found that
“the system was excessively complicated for the
clients, with too many plans, and unnecessary 
variation across the plans in terms of premiums,
benefits, covered drugs, rules, forms, and proce-
dures.”10 This finding was strongly supported by a
panel of counselors convened for this issue brief
by its author.
Other informed observers agree. The
Commonwealth Fund’s survey of health care opin-
ion leaders strongly backed a move toward more
standardization of Part D. Nearly all respondents
(88%) agreed that “plans should be required to use
the same terms to describe the same benefits,”
while about three-fourths maintained that “bene-
fits should be more standardized to reduce the
variation among plans.”11
The case for greater standardization starts
with the complexity of the program, but it is rein-
forced by evidence that Medicare beneficiaries
neither seek more choices in the program nor are
skilled in dealing with a profusion of them. Over
the past decade, several studies have suggested that
Medicare beneficiaries are often overwhelmed by
the amount of information they receive about
Medicare Advantage and other options.12 They
typically cite an inability to sort through the vol-
ume of information to make informed and
rational decisions.13 In particular, studies suggest
that elderly Medicare beneficiaries have much
more difficulty interpreting comparative data than
do nonelderly consumers.14 Furthermore, at least
one-fourth of beneficiaries have inadequate or
marginal health literacy, with even higher rates of
inadequate literacy among Spanish speakers and
beneficiaries over age 85.15
There is also a growing body of literature,
outside the Medicare world, suggesting that
although people like the concept of choice, their
decision-making ability is compromised when
confronted with a large number of options, as they
are in the Medicare drug benefit. For example, one
study found that subjects were more likely to make
a choice when offered a limited array of six
choices than they were when faced with an array
of 24 to 30 choices.16 A study of choice among
401(k) retirement plans found higher employee
participation when employers offered 10 or fewer
plan choices.17
In contrast to the Medicare Advantage pro-
gram, where a beneficiary who makes no choice
at all simply remains in traditional Medicare, the
drug benefit requires an active choice. Because the
program is voluntary, those who do not choose a
drug plan receive no drug benefit. It seems likely
that many of the 4.6 million beneficiaries with no
apparent source of drug coverage—that is, those
who did not apply—may have been discouraged
by this program’s complexity. In particular, the 2.6
million beneficiaries estimated to be eligible for,
but not enrolled in, the low-income subsidy appear
to have failed to take up a benefit that would have
been of clear value to them.18 Of course, there
probably were additional reasons why some benefi-
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ciaries failed to apply for the drug benefit.
Shortcomings in outreach efforts and the voluntary
nature of the program, requiring active enrollment
decisions, were certainly important as well. But
these factors would certainly be exacerbated by the
program’s complexity and consequent lack of 
clear information.
For those who did enroll, the program’s
complexity may have interfered with their ability
to make a good choice. It may be rational for
some to simplify their decisions by selecting a plan
with a familiar name (e.g., AARP or Blue Cross)
or one that is offered by a company with which
they have an ongoing relationship (e.g., the spon-
sor of their Medigap supplemental insurance).
Others may have chosen a plan solely on the basis
of a lower monthly premium, the absence of a
deductible, or the absence of a coverage gap. But
the impressions of counselors who worked closely
with beneficiaries were that many resorted to these
simplifying strategies because it was too difficult to
understand and sort out their options. 
A move toward standardization could make
it easier for beneficiaries to review options that
have significant differences and to find the plan
that best meets their particular needs.
Arguments Against Standardization—
at Least, in the Short Term
A key argument some make against standardization
is that time should be allowed for the market to
stabilize. In early 2006, Medicare’s administrator
stated that market forces were already starting to
drive toward simplification.19 As the market
matures, the reasoning goes, it will become easier
for beneficiaries to navigate and standardization
will be less necessary. After all, in its brief history,
since 2006, Part D has been a new market both for
plan sponsors and beneficiaries. Stand-alone drug
plans were new products for many sponsors, who
had compressed time frames within which to make
decisions about benefit design, formularies, and
marketing strategies. For their part, beneficiaries
not only had to learn about the existence of the
new benefit but also needed to sort through an array of
choices under looming enrollment deadlines. 
Some health policy experts are absolutely
against standardization, whether for a young or for
a mature market, believing that plan flexibility is
the key factor in driving down program costs. In
this view, the considerable flexibility of Part D
plans has been useful in establishing formularies
and designing benefits to generate high rates of
generic substitution, encourage more appropriate
use of drugs, and negotiate effectively for 
discounted prices. 
As the market matures, standardization
might start to occur. Some plan sponsors will leave
the market, while new ones will enter. Sponsors
remaining in the market are likely to shift their
arrays of offerings. As they do so, plans will tend to
consider both their competitors’ offerings and their
own experiences with enrollment and financial
results and will make adjustments that might lead
to some convergence in designs. For example,
plans’ use of specialty tiers increased dramatically
after the program’s first year.20 But, as the market
matures, plans also may seek innovative approaches
in order to distinguish themselves. In 2008, three
national plans added a second tier for generic
drugs in an apparent attempt to fine-tune the
incentives for using generics.21
CMS has taken some steps in the program’s
first two years to direct the market toward some
simplification in order to make information clearer
to beneficiaries. Specifically, the agency directs plan
sponsors to ensure that the plans offered provide
beneficiaries with “substantially different options.”22
In addition, rather than allowing each sponsor to
offer three plan options, as in 2006, CMS permit-
ted only two in 2007 and 2008, with the possibil-
ity of a third option that offers enhanced coverage
(such as coverage in the gap). Many sponsors took
advantage of the latter approach. 
Simplification and standardization are not
necessarily the same thing, however. The CMS
instruction to differentiate plan options reflects the
agency’s goal of reducing the overwhelming arrays
of similar but not identical plans originating
within individual organizations. But pursuing that
goal would tend to increase the overall variation in plan
offerings across organizations.
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The agency also has sought to improve the
ways in which sponsors display comparative plan
information—for example, by enhancing the
online tool it makes available to beneficiaries and
their advisers. The Medicare Prescription Drug
Plan Finder includes information on all plans, as
well as tools to help consumers make comparisons.
Another argument for waiting before stan-
dardizing the benefit design is that it would pro-
vide more time to examine closely the preferences
that beneficiaries reveal when selecting plans. To
date, beneficiaries have chosen plans with benefits
structured differently from the standard benefit
defined in the law; they have largely selected plans
with no deductibles, fixed copayments, and access
to a broad range of drugs. But to the extent that
they based choices mostly on low premiums or
familiar sponsors, they may not be revealing prefer-
ences for particular benefit design features.
Standardizing Part D Benefit Descriptions
and Procedures
Still, despite the availability of 30 percent more
plans in 2007 and the many changes to existing
plan designs, most beneficiaries retained their first-
year plan selection over the next two years. CMS
estimates that only 6 to 7 percent of enrollees
switched plans for either 2007 or 2008. This stabil-
ity may reflect satisfaction with their current plans,
a general preference for staying put in the absence
of major changes, or a reluctance or inability to
effectively research their options.
While arguments both for and against stan-
dardization of the Medicare drug benefit need to
be weighed carefully, and reconsidered in the light
of program experience just starting to be accumu-
lated, it seems important to take at least some steps
toward standardization in the near term. These
could help not only to reduce beneficiaries’ confu-
sion and anxiety about whether or not to partici-
pate but also to enable sound decision-making for
their own particular circumstances. Six areas might
profit from standardization actions taken sooner
rather than later, and this section presents specific
options for changes.
Labeling Cost-Sharing Tiers. Prescription
drug plans have total flexibility in creating tiers.
But PDPs have used up to six tiers, and their
descriptions can be misleading.23 For example, in
2006, one national organization created both a
Tier Structure Stand-alone
PDPs 2006
Stand-alone
PDPs 2007
Stand-alone
PDPs 2008
Standard (25% coinsurance) 9% 14% 12%
Generic/brand (without specialty tier) 8% <1% <1%
Generic/brand (with specialty tier) 22% 17% 5%
Generic/preferred brand/nonpreferred brand (without specialty tier) 23% 4% 2%
Generic/preferred brand/nonpreferred brand (with specialty tier) 38% 65% 74%
Other 1% <1% 6%
Note: PDPs exclude plans offered in U.S. territories. Numbers do not sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
Sources: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), “Part D Plan Offerings,” in Report to the Congress: Increasing the Value of
Medicare (June 2006); “Part D Enrollment, Benefit Offerings, and Plan Payments,” in Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy (March
2008); and author’s calculations.
Table 2. Distribution of Plans, by Tier Structure, 2006–2008
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preferred tier and a nonpreferred tier for generic
drugs, yet their cost-sharing was identical. Further-
more, whereas most plans label their preferred and
nonpreferred brand-name tiers as tier 2 and tier 3,
respectively, this plan called them tier 3 and tier 4.
In 2008, another plan added a “value generic” tier
for lower-cost generic drugs, but it is labeled in the
Drug Plan Finder as tier 5 and so may appear to some as
a high-priced tier. These descriptions can be confusing
to beneficiaries when comparing plans.
In the program’s first three years, the vast
majority of plans have employed one of five basic designs,
after eliminating any tiers without real distinctions: 
 The standard benefit, with 25 percent 
coinsurance and no tiering
 A two-tier structure (generics and brands)
 A two-tier structure with an additional 
specialty tier
 A three-tier structure (generics, preferred
brands, and nonpreferred brands)
 A three-tier structure with an additional 
specialty tier
Only 1 percent of stand-alone PDPs used a
tier structure other than these five designs in 2006
and 2007 (Table 2).24 In 2008, however, plans are
trending both toward and away from standardiza-
tion. On one hand, there has been an increase in
benefit designs that vary from the most common
designs (mostly by adding a second tier for generic
drugs). On the other hand, there has been a signif-
icant consolidation toward the tier structure with
three standard tiers and a specialty tier, with about
three-fourths of all PDPs in 2008 using the three-
tier structure with an additional specialty tier.25
Labeling Specialty Tiers. As shown in Table
2, most plans with any benefit design other than
the standard benefit now use specialty tiers for
higher-cost medications such as biotechnology
products or injectable drugs. Beneficiary coinsur-
ance for these expensive drugs is normally set by
plans at anywhere from 25 to 33 percent. Because
CMS guidance allows organizations to limit the
ability of plan enrollees to file appeals requesting
that a drug on this tier be made available at a
lower level of cost-sharing, it is especially impor-
tant that beneficiaries understand these tiers. They
need to know that a drug is on the specialty tier
and that appeal rights are limited, not just what
their cost-sharing will be.27
Option: To simplify tier-design options,
plans should be required to adopt one of the
five tier structures described above and to
label tiers accordingly. In fact, given that spe-
cialty tiers have become the industry stan-
dard, three structures might be adequate.
Alternatively, variations on these models
could be allowed, but only if they were
labeled so that cost-sharing and formulary
comparisons among plans were clear.26
Option: To improve enrollees’ ability to
compare benefit packages, CMS should
require sponsors to label clearly plans that
have enhanced benefits and to designate the
plan features that constitute the enhanced
value. In that way, consumers could see more
clearly what value they would receive for the
higher premiums usually charged, and would
be better able to make accurate comparisons
when considering their options.
Option: To reduce confusion, plans should
be required to designate only a single spe-
cialty tier and to label it accordingly on all
displays, including the Drug Plan Finder.
They should be required to label it simply as
the “specialty tier,” as opposed to using a tier
number. Furthermore, there should be a spe-
cific stipulation that they have no right to
request a formulary exception to lower the
cost-sharing paid for the drug.
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Currently, however, the labeling of specialty
tiers is likely to confuse beneficiaries. Some plans
have created two separate specialty tiers (e.g., one
for biotechnology products and one for injectable
drugs), but they apply the same coinsurance rate to
both tiers. It is possible that one such tier is an
official specialty tier for which plans claim an
appeals exemption. But if this is indeed the dis-
tinction, it is unclear in either the Drug Plan
Finder or other information provided by plans. At
one point in 2007, the Drug Plan Finder provided
improved labeling of specialty tiers, but in 2008 it
has reverted to simply labeling tiers by numbers
with no distinctions when two such tiers are used. 
Enhanced Plan Benefits. In 2008, 51 per-
cent of PDPs (with an estimated 21 percent of
PDP enrollees) had enhanced benefits.28 Because
benefits with an actuarial value greater than the
standard benefit could not be subsidized by federal
funds, the portion of the premium corresponding
to these benefits had to be fully paid by the bene-
ficiary. There was no indicator in the 2006 Drug
Plan Finder, however, that allowed beneficiaries to
easily identify plans with enhanced benefits. This
information is now displayed in CMS plan listings,
but it remains difficult to determine the enhanced
value of such a plan. 
Adding to the confusion, the enhanced
plans offered by some organizations have premi-
ums lower than those of their standard-benefit
plans. For example, the Medicare Rx Value plan is
an enhanced plan offered by United Healthcare
with a weighted-average monthly premium of
$22.58. By contrast, United Healthcare’s Medicare
Rx Basic plan has an average premium of $40.36,
despite not being an enhanced plan. Because nei-
ther provides any coverage in the gap and the
Basic plan waives the deductible, it is unclear even
to an experienced researcher what enhanced value
is provided by the Value plan. 
Cost-Sharing Descriptions. Consumers
using the Drug Plan Finder are able to identify
precisely the cost-sharing they would face for each
specific drug they use. But the general plan listings
in the Drug Plan Finder and the Medicare & You
handbook display only cost-sharing ranges.
Although specific cost-sharing amounts by tier are
shown in the Drug Plan Finder as a user clicks
through to more detailed displays, the information
is not easy to use.
Standard Rules and Procedures for
Utilization Management. Most Part D plans apply
utilization-management tools—prior authoriza-
Option: In combination with the standard-
ized tier descriptions described above, CMS
should clearly specify the cost-sharing appli-
cable to each tier in all displays. These
descriptions could be even simpler if 
organizations offering plans in multiple
regions were required to apply the same cost-
sharing rules everywhere, rather than allow-
ing the small variations that currently exist
for some organizations from region to
region. This step might require a modifica-
tion of the CMS interpretation of actuarial-
equivalency requirements.
Option: CMS should do more to encourage
the use by plans of standard forms and proce-
dures. In addition, CMS should require plans
to describe the utilization management tools
they use and to include such information in
the Drug Plan Finder. Better information
would give beneficiaries and providers an
idea of the barriers they may face in contin-
uing current medications. For example, it
might be possible to create a set of labels to
indicate which drugs must be taken first for
step therapy, or what the applicable criterion
is for prior authorization (e.g., safety, off-label
use, or potential for payment under Medicare
Part B). Alternatively, plans could be asked to
make explicit general standards for prior
authorization (or other restrictions) applica-
ble to different drug classes.
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tion, step therapy, and quantity limits—to at least
some covered drugs. While the presence of these
requirements is relatively easy to determine using
the Drug Plan Finder, their meaning in any given
situation is unclear to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries,
physicians, and pharmacists all complain that it is
hard to find out what is needed to meet a particu-
lar requirement.29 CMS, in the call letter for 2009
plan submissions, has told plans that they must sub-
mit standardized criteria for prior authorization
and post their approved criteria on plan Web sites.
It is unclear how well this new approach will meet
the concerns of beneficiaries and providers. What
many of them want to know is how strictly differ-
ent plans enforce their utilization management
rules and whether they do so on a timely basis.
Another step forward was the release in
2006 by the American Medical Association and
America’s Health Insurance Plans, in conjunction
with CMS, of a standardized form designed for
requests for a coverage determination, including
requests for tiering or formulary exceptions,
regardless of the drug plan in which the patient is
enrolled.30 While plans generally must accept this
form, it is officially optional, and plans may request
additional information. Although adoption of stan-
dard forms may not help beneficiaries directly, it
should increase the willingness of physicians and
pharmacists to help them get approval for drugs
most appropriate to their needs.31
Coverage in the Gap. A subset of drug
plans supplement their coverage with at least some
coverage of drugs in the benefit’s coverage gap
(the “doughnut hole”). In 2008, 29 percent of
PDPs offered such coverage, while just over half
(51 percent) of MA-PDs did so—with both rates
having grown considerably since 2006. Most plans
that offer some gap coverage in 2008 limit it to
generic drugs, including all but one PDP and about
two-thirds of the MA-PDs with some coverage.32
Accurate labeling of gap coverage has been
an ongoing problem. One plan in 2007 was inac-
curately labeled with more gap coverage than was
the case.33 In 2008, the proportion of plans with
gap coverage has risen, but many of them have
narrowed their coverage—for example, shifting
from covering all generics to covering “some
generics” or “all preferred generics.” In fact, there
are 12 different descriptions of gap coverage used
in the Drug Plan Finder, without any standard def-
initions. It is unclear whether, for instance, “some
generics” refers to more drugs than does “all pre-
ferred generics.”34
Further Standardization of 
Plan Benefit Parameters
Even if the Medicare program takes steps to estab-
lish simpler labeling and clearer descriptions of
benefit parameters, beneficiaries might still find the
substantial variation in plan offerings overwhelm-
ing. In the future, it may make sense to require
further moves toward standard designs, similar to
what is required for Medicare supplemental
(Medigap) insurance and, as described in a com-
panion issue brief, for Medicare Advantage.35 A
move in this direction, however, might seem to be
counter to the guidance in recent CMS call letters
to potential plan sponsors. The guidance encour-
ages plan sponsors to make sure different plans
provide beneficiaries with substantially different
options. In doing so, CMS has encouraged not
only clear differences between the options offered
by a single sponsor, but also a proliferation of plans
that confront beneficiaries with a dizzying array of
variations, as illustrated in Table 1. 
To some extent, beneficiaries have been
voting with their feet by gravitating toward certain
benefit designs. The meaningfulness of these
revealed preferences is limited, however, since ben-
eficiaries appear to pick more on plan name and
Option: CMS should consider requiring 
that plans select between two options: use the
standard deductible or eliminate the
deductible entirely.
Option: CMS should require standard word-
ing for descriptions of gap coverage and 
precise definitions of what terms mean.
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premium than on specific features, and may be led
to making “wrong” choices through confusion or
lack of appropriate information. As a result, plan
popularity should be only one of several factors to be
considered in winnowing out the options.
Deductible. A majority of beneficiaries
have selected plans with no deductibles, and most
of the rest have enrolled in low-premium plans
with the standard deductible. Under 5 percent of
beneficiaries have enrolled in the few plans that
maintain a deductible but reduce it below the
standard level. 
Cost-Sharing Amounts.With so many
cost-sharing options, beneficiaries are likely to find
it hard to compare the value of one plan to that of
another. Based on the examples in Table 1, it may
be clear that a plan with a three-tier cost-sharing
structure of $7/$30/$74.85 will have higher out-
of-pocket costs than one with copays of
$4/$25/$54. But will the plan with the latter
structure have lower costs than a competing plan
with copays of $0/$45/$107? Or is the former
plan a better deal than one with copays of $6 and
$35, and coinsurance of 75 percent in the nonpre-
ferred brand tier? 
Given the proliferation of different cost-
sharing structures and the confusion that results
when trying to compare disparate designs, it might
make sense for the program to restrict the range of
variation in copayment amounts.36 So far, benefici-
aries have disproportionately selected plans with
fixed copayments, as opposed to percentage coin-
surance; but it is hard to tell whether, for example,
they would prefer narrower or wider spreads in the
copayments assigned to each of the tiers.
As with any approach to limiting tier struc-
tures, plans might see such restrictions as limiting
their flexibility in negotiating for discounts and
rebates. Ensuring that the designated options
include designs with weaker and stronger incen-
tives for the use of generic or preferred drugs
should at least partially address this concern.
Possible Standardization of Formularies
A more challenging question is whether a greater
degree of standardization should be applied to plan
formularies. Requirement of standard formularies
would help address a major source of concern and
confusion for beneficiaries, but would be opposed
by plans and some others because it would tend to
undermine the goals of the market-based approach
adopted in the MMA. Plans are expected to enter
into independent and competitive negotiations
with drug manufacturers, and bargaining would
Option: Plans should be required to use the
standard classification system and to display
plan formularies in that framework (or a sim-
plified version of it). This requirement would
make it easier for beneficiaries to understand
distinctions between plan formularies. For
example, the statutory requirement that plans
include at least two drugs in each category
and class would mean the same thing for all plans.
Option: As a starting point, CMS should
consider requiring plans to round their
copayment amounts for the tiers associated
with brand-name drugs to the nearest $5 and
to confine copayments for the generic tier to
a modest set of options (e.g., $0, $2, $5, or
$10).37 Further simplification of offerings
would be achieved by restricting the range of
copayment amounts attached to particular
tiers. For example, within the three-tier plan
designs (with separate copayment levels for
generic drugs, preferred brand drugs, and
nonpreferred brand drugs), CMS might allow
just three copayment options. One option
could have only modest differences between
the tiers (e.g., $5, $20, and $40); the second
could increase the tilt toward generic drugs
($0, $25, and $50); and the third could
increase the tilt toward both generics and
preferred brand-name drugs ($0, $15, and $60).38
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result in a range of decisions about which drugs
are on formulary and what utilization limits or
cost-sharing requirements apply. One plan might
negotiate a deal with one manufacturer to prefer
its medication in a particular drug class in
exchange for a lower price. A second plan might
cut a similar deal for a competing drug. And a
third plan might include both drugs, promising a
broader formulary to potential enrollees in
exchange for a higher premium. 
Formularies have been a major source of
plan variability, and one that is difficult to describe
clearly to beneficiaries.39 The Drug Plan Finder is a
good tool for allowing beneficiaries to identify the
placement and cost-sharing for their particular
drugs on a plan’s formulary. But beneficiaries 
trying to calculate future drug needs have no 
helpful means of identifying which plan formula-
ries are the most complete and which are the 
most restrictive. 
Some beneficiary advocates would prefer
less-restrictive formularies, envisioning a system
where CMS requires plans to cover a set of drugs
for which there are clear clinical indications. Plans
might still be allowed to offer incentives to use
preferred products (e.g., through tiered cost-shar-
ing) while still including all required drugs on for-
mulary. Some plans essentially have open formula-
ries in which all drugs are available (though bene-
ficiaries may find it hard to identify these plans
using the Drug Plan Finder). The current system
of exceptions and appeals offers beneficiaries and
physicians a way to obtain drugs not listed on a
plan’s formulary, but they often find these procedures
difficult to use.
Even if standard formularies were not
required, several steps could be taken to make it
easier for beneficiaries to compare the formularies
offered by different plans.
Standard Classification System. In accor-
dance with the law, CMS adopted a model classifi-
cation system, but does not require its use. The
classification system not only helps standardize the
way formularies are presented and organized, but
also provides a framework for the statutory
requirement that plans list on formulary at least
two drugs for each therapeutic category and phar-
macologic class. CMS guidelines for 2006 and
2007 also required that plans cover at least one
drug in each formulary key drug type (a third level
of the classification system). There were other pro-
visions in the guidelines as well, with some excep-
tions allowable on clinical grounds.40 About one-
fourth of plans, however, substituted their own
classification system in 2006, and according to
CMS that number has increased to over half in
2008.41
Standards for Formulary Review. Even if
formularies were not standardized, the guidance
for formulary review could be strengthened. CMS
guidance has been modified each year to date, but
it starts with the statutory requirement that two
drugs be on formulary from each category and
class. It has also mandated nearly complete cover-
age of the drugs in a set of protected drug classes,
including immunosuppressant drugs used by trans-
plant recipients and drugs used to treat mental
health conditions, HIV/AIDS, and cancer.
Option: With the experience gained from
the first years of Medicare Part D and more
clinical input, CMS should refine the two-
drugs-per-class rule, the set of protected
classes, and related standards to better accom-
modate the differences across drug classes.
This could mean, for example, requiring
more than two drugs in some drug classes
and only a single drug in other classes. 
Option: Summary measures on plan formu-
laries should be displayed in the Drug Plan
Finder. Such measures should focus on both
the completeness and the restrictiveness of
formularies, and if possible should also incorporate
the ease of obtaining access to off-formulary or
restricted drugs.
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Summary Measures for Formularies.
Currently, the Drug Plan Finder includes no sum-
mary measures for plan formularies. In 2006, the
share on formulary of the most commonly pre-
scribed drugs was displayed, but this type of meas-
ure focuses solely on a particular subset of drugs
and does not reveal whether less commonly prescribed
drugs are also listed. Summary measures of the
completeness or restrictiveness of formularies have
been plagued by methodological issues. For exam-
ple, there is no agreement on how to count differ-
ent forms and strengths of a given drug or varying
generic versions made by different manufacturers.42
Expected Impact on the Plan Market and
Beneficiary Access
Clearer descriptions and some reduction in the
proliferation of options should make it easier for
beneficiaries to choose plans. Furthermore, if good
information constitutes one underpinning of an
effective market, this market would operate more
efficiently with plans competing on clearly defined
dimensions of quality, service, and access rather
than on a broad range of characteristics that are
poorly defined and hard to understand. 
In 2006, many beneficiaries simply selected
plans with the most familiar names or with the
lowest overall premiums. While this may have
seemed a valid strategy at the time, better information
and a clearer set of choices could make it possible
for some to see that a plan with, for example, a
higher premium might be a good buy because of
lower cost-sharing or a more inclusive formulary. 
Most beneficiaries have remained with the
same plan they chose in the program’s first year.
Their decisions could reflect satisfaction with their
current plans, but they could also indicate that
beneficiaries were unwilling or unable to research
options to make a change even when plan premi-
ums and benefits were substantially modified.
Many observers speculate that few even consid-
ered making a change in the absence of com-
pelling circumstances. A shift toward greater sim-
plicity and more standardization would have the
potential to improve beneficiaries’ ability to
choose plans that suit their needs. They would
then be making the most of their Medicare drug
benefit, while plans would be encouraged to 
compete in a market that is more responsive to
beneficiaries’ preferences.
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